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CASE COMMENTS
THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT:
JURISDICTION FORCED ASHORE
The scope of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act' passed by Congress in 19272 was limited in one respect by
its extension of coverage to only those injuries which occurred upon
the navigable waters of the United States. 3 This jurisdictional requirement precluded recovery by a claimant injured on land (excepting
dry docks) even though his employment was maritime in nature.4 Thus,
longshoremen, whose duties of loading and unloading vessels moored
upon navigable waters necessitated constant passage over the boundary
line between land and sea, were subjected to uncertainty of coverage
when injuries occurred near this line.5 There has been less ambiguity
as to coverage, however, where the injury took place either upon a
type of vessel on navigable waters, wherein the Longshoremen's Act
'133 U.S.C. §§ 9Ol-95o (1964).
2For a thorough historical analysis of the events leading up to the passage of the
Longshoremen's Act see H. BAER, ADMIRALITY LAW OF THE SUPREME COuRT 70-74
(1963); G. GILMORE

: C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 333-37 (1957)

[hereinafter

cited as GILMORE & BLACK]; 3 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §§ 89.20-.22
(1968) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
3Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C § 9o3(a)
(1964), reads in part as follows:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter... only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not
validly be provided by State law.
43 LARSON § 89.23(a) (1968). This exclusion possibly reflected either congressional
uncertainty as to the bounds of the admiralty jurisdiction under the Constitution,
or a policy decision to allow the utmost effect to the various state compensation laws.
GILMORE & BLACK 339 (1957).
5See Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 64o, 647 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965) (dissenting opinion). For a classical illustration of the
judicial handling of this problem see Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295
U.S. 647 (1935); T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928). The scope of this
comment precludes any historical discussion of the judicial treatment of this problem subsequent to the passage of the Longshoremen's Act. For a comprehensive
view of both the plethora of litigation it provoked and the evanescent doctrines
which emerged, see generally H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT
74-91 (1963); GILMORE SLBLACK 340-58 (1957); 3 LARSON §§ 89 .23(b)-.6o (1968).
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applied, 6 or wholly upon a pier, dock or wharf, in which case the
particular state compensation act has been uniformly held to af7
ford exclusive relief.
Nevertheless, where longshoremen have suffered pierside injuries,
frequent attempts have been undertaken to secure compensation under
the federal statute as it generally affords more liberal benefits than
those available under the respective state acts.8 Yet, uniformity as to
state jurisdiction over dockside accidents has been maintained by
the courts even in the face of the temptation to allow an injured
claimant the more generous awards available under the Longshoremen's Act. 9
This relative certainty concerning state jurisdiction over injuries
to longshoremen occurring solely on docks or piers has been cast
aside, however, by the recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting.10 A consolidation of three cases on appeal,11 Marine Stevedoring
OE.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953) (situs and work on
a railroad car float upon navigable waters determinative even though injured
employee was not a longshoreman); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281
U.S. 128 (1930); West v. Erie R.R., 163 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (injury on gangplank extending from barge afloat on navigable waters).
7The theory here is that a dock or any other sufficiently permanent structure
of like nature projecting into navigable waters is an extension of land, and, as such,
any injury occurring thereon could not come within the jurisdictional requirement
"upon navigable waters." Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); State Indus.
Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382
F.2d 344 (5 th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1o5o (1968); Stansbury v. Atlantic
& Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 159 So. 2d 728 (La. Ct. App. 1964); O'Neil's Case, 293 Mass.
41, 199 N.E. 323 (1935).
8
Compare Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 908-09 (1964) with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-54, -55, -56, -65 (Repl. Vol. 1968). For
a bird's-eye view of a comparison between the various provisions and benefits of
the Longshoremen's Act and the state acts see generally 3 LARSON 509-61 (apps. A-C)
(1968). See also 36 TUL. L. REv. 134, 137 n.6 (q961). Note further that the statutes
of limitations under the federal and state acts may vary. For a good discussion of
the possible effects of this problem see Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927: Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the
Longshoreman, 64 MiC. L. REV. 1553, 1562-63 (1966).
"See Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
of 1927: Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 1553 (1966). But, it has been suggested that this temptation "should not
be underestimated." Id. at 1563.
10398 F.2d 900 (4 th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Dec. 1o,
1968) (Nos. 528, 663).
"The cases are as follows: (1)Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F.
Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965) in which a longshoreman was propelled from the edge
of the pier (by the straightening of a mooring line cable) into the adjacent navigable river where he drowned. The district court upheld an award under the Longshoremen's Act, and the employer along with his insurer appealed; (2) Johnson v.
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concerned separate situations where longshoremen sustained injuries
while working on piers of sufficient height to allow the passage of small
12
craft under them.
After framing the controversy as being basically an inquiry into
whether an injury on a pier was within the jurisdictional strictures of
"upon navigable waters" and thus within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act, 13 the court apparently lost sight of this narrow issue
as it pursued the following alternative routes in implementing its
decision: (1)jurisdiction was congressionally intended to be grounded upon status of employment rather than upon situs of injury; 14 (2)
the Extension of Admiralty Act of 194815 impliedly expanded the
coverage of the Longshoremen's Act to encompass dockside injuries;' 6
and (3)since the waters below the piers concerned were navigable in
fact and jurisdiction extended to accidents occurring in the airspace
above such waters, then injuries on these docks above such waters
7
must also have been "upon navigable waters."'
Implying that each approach in and of itself was dispositive, the
court stated that "[r]egardless of the route traveled, we arrive at the
conclusion that the injuries of all four longshoremen are embraced
by the Act."' s The court was able to reach this result even though its
effect necessarily contravened a firmly established line of precedent
and authority concerning accidents sustained by longshoremen solely
on piers or docks. 19
Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965) in which two longshoremen, Johnson and
Klosek, sustained injuries (Klosek's were fatal) while working on a pier inside a
gondola car attaching loads of cargo to the ship's crane. Johnson along with
Klosek's widow appealed the district court's affirmance of a denial of their claims
under the Longshoremen's Act; (3)East v. Oosting, 245 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1965)
where one Avery was injured by a swinging load of cargo from the ship's crane
while working on a pier. Avery appealed a denial of relief under the Act as affirmed
by the district court.
"Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 9oo, 902 (4th Cir. 1968).
231d. at 9o2.
"'Id. at 904.
1"The Extension of Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964) provides in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall
extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property,
caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage
or injury be done or consummated on land.
1398 F.2d at go6.
21ld. at 9o8.
281d. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in Marine Stevedoring, and
reversed the judgment in Johnson (as to both longshoremen) and in East (as to
Avery).
'DSee cases cited note 7 supra, as well as -the imposing list of cases and authorities cited by Chief Judge Haynsworth in his dissent in Marine Stevedoring. 398
F.2d at 913 n.23 (dissenting opinion). The doctrine that a dock is an extension of
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The court's primary approach, to the effect that jurisdiction under
the Longshoremen's Act was grounded upon the status of the employees as longshoremen or harbor workers, and not upon the situs
of the accident, has seen near uniform rejection where considered
by other tribunals. 20 It was perhaps with this realization in mind that
the court resorted to reliance upon selected excerpts from the legislative history behind the Act 2' which, coupled with recent judicial interpretations, 22 purportedly furnished a conclusive resolution of the
issue.2
land has been referred to as established by a "settled line of precedent...." Houser
v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 39o U.S. 954 (1968).
Another court stated that it could safely follow this doctrine because "the plethora
of cases safely navigates us...." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344, 349 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U-S. 1o5o (1968). It has been said that this doctrine
has existed "[flrom time immemorial...." East v. Oosting, 245 F. Supp. 51, 53
(E.D. Va. 1965).
"OHouser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 US. 954
(1968); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1o5o (1968); O'Keeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring CO., 354 F.2d 48 (sth Cir. 1965). See
Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953) where in response to an
argument that a railroad employee injured on a car float upon navigable waters
could not be within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act, the Court stated that
"the emphasis on the nature of [claimant's] duties here misses the mark. The
statute applies, by its own terms, to accidents on navigable waters ....
Id. at 339.
"398 F.2d at 9o4-o5 n. 7-'The court relied principally on certain language in Calbeck v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), to the effect that Congress had originally meant the
Longshoremen's Act to cover all those injured harbor workers to which its authority
could be extended. As the court itself allowed, however, the Supreme Court in
Calbech was not concerned with the meaning of "upon navigable waters," but
was only concerned with interpreting the second limitation as expressed in
section 3(a) of the Longshoremen's Act. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 9o3(a) (1964). Calbeck has been understood as
affirming the established principle that situs of the injury remains as the determinative factor in situations where coverage under the Act is questionable. Houser v.
O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 ( 9 th Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968). One commentator noted that in Calbeck the Supreme Court provided a simplified yardstick
of jurisdictional power to extend coverage under the Longshoremen's Act based
purely on location. H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT 87-88 (1963).

Others have also agreed that Calbeck retains the situs test. See 1963 DUKE L.J. 327,
333; 48 CORNELL L.Q. 532, 541 (1963). In answering these arguments, the court
could do no more than repeat the contention of Judge Palmieri in Michigan Mut.
Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), af'cd on other grounds,
344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 835 (1965), that the importance of the
holding in Calbeck could be found in the approach taken by the Supreme Court
to the effect that the Act was to be viewed as an intentional exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction. 398 F.2d at go5. By thus qualifying the applicability of Calbeck
solely through the use of an unsupported interpretation of a district court judge,
the court revealed its apparent inability to develop any substantial basis for its
rejection of the usual view that Calbeck has no bearing in determining the meaning of "upon navigable waters."
u398 F.2d at go5.
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From the standpoint of congressional intent as revealed by the
legislative history behind the Longshoremen's Act, the court structured its theory by admitting the credibility of the following statement extracted from a report by the Senate Judiciary Committee con24
cerning the purpose of the proposed Act.

[I]t should be remarked that injuries occurring in loading or
unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or bethem within the
tween the wharf and the ship so as to bring
25
maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Clearly this statement is expressive of congressional intention to exclude coverage from dockside injuries, 26 yet the court suggested that it
would be "no less reasonable" to read the passage as indicative of
an inclusive approach whereby the Longshoremen's Act would cover all
longshoremen injured within the maritime jurisdiction. 27 This interpretation, to the effect that Congress was concerned with status as opposed
to situs, seems to be less reasonable, however, in that its ultimate
effect would be to allow recovery for pierside accidents even though
by the express limitations of the statement itself such coverage would
be precluded.
Seemingly unconvinced as to the strength of the status theory as
grounds for its decision, the court proceeded upon an alternative
route to the effect that the Extension of Admiralty Act 28 impliedly
amended the coverage provisions of the Longshoremen's Act so as
2

id. at 9o4-o5 n.7.
REP. No. 973, 69 th Cong. ist Sess. 16 (1926).
-See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946), where the Court construed
-S.

this statement from the Senate Judiciary Committee as an expression of doubt as
to the constitutional power of Congress to grant recovery to employees injured on
shore, thus evidencing the concern with situs as opposed to status.
'398 F.2d at 904-o5 n.7. In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on

selected passages from congressional reports wherein references to longshoremen
included statements as to the "character of their employment," their "occupation,"
and their situation as a "class of maritime workers ... placed under [the] jurisdiction" of Congress. Id. The court allowed that such language indicated "that Congress was primarily concerned with the status of the [longshoremen]." Id. (emphasis added). Admittedly, the status of the potential claimants must necessarily
have been of some concern to those committees considering a proposal which would
extend compensation benefits to a specified class of workers alone. Congress, however, was seemingly more preoccupied with insuring conformance with the constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction which existed at that time, and most
probably would not have adopted the inclusive approach that the court here
suggests. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra. Furthermore, it appears as if
the Supreme Court itself has not agreed with the court's conclusion. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953); Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S.
1 (1946).
rIhe Extension of Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
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to include pierside injuries 2 This proposition, even though the
strongest of the three,3 0 has been firmly rejected, 3 ' and, as it is necessarily based upon a situs approach, only detracts from the plausibility
of the status theory.
The court's ultimate reliance upon a situs approach is further
evidenced by the rationale of its third theory based upon the following conclusions: (i) that the waters beneath the piers in question were
"navigable in fact;"8 2 (2) that "the jurisdictional scope of the phrase
'upon navigable waters' extends to injuries occurring 'above' such
waters;" 33 and (3) that consequently, injuries suffered on piers which
-1398 F.2d at 9o6. The theory of the court here again necessitates reliance upon
Calbeck, which, as has been noted, was not concerned with the meaning of "upon
navigable waters." See note 22 supra. The court reasons, however, that in the light
of Calbeck, "upon navigable waters" must be construed to include the full range
of the expanded maritime jurisdiction. Thus when the Extension of Admiralty
Act stretched this jurisdiction to shore-based injuries caused by vessels, the Longshoremen's Act was correspondingly expanded to include coverage for dockside
injuries. Even if this theory were acceptable, however, it affords no panacea since
longshoremen who were injured on piers could not successfully claim compensation
under the Act unless their accident were occasioned by a vessel, or in some manner
by its gear.
mThere is some support for this theory. See Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien,
233 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afJ'd on other grounds, 344 F.,d 640 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965). Note, however, that the issue of the applicability
of this theory was not reached on appeal. 344 F.2d at 646 n.4. Of course recoveries
for damages by longshoremen for dockside injuries have been sustained upon findings of unseaworthiness or negligence. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373
U.. 2o6 (1963). The scope of this comment precludes concern with remedies available to the injured longshoreman other than that of compensation under the Act.
For an exhaustive analysis of these remedies including the interaction between them,
see Comment, Overlapping Remedies for Injured Harborworkers:Interaction on the
Waterfront, 67 YALE L.J. 1205 (1958). But for an excellent argument that the
compensation remedy affords the most practical and effective system of relief for an
injured longshoreman, see Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness"
Doctrine to Longshoremen, iii U. PA. L. R.EV. 1137 (1963).
nE.g., Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
954 (1968); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344 ( 5 th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1050 (1968); see, Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See particularly Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp.
184, 188-97 (D. Md. 1965), one of the opinions from which the appeals in M'arine
Stevedoring come, in which there appears an exhaustive refutation of this theory.
'398 F.2d at 9o8.
1Id. The court cited as authority D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259
F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958). D'Aleman involved a wrongful death action with the
alleged cause of death occurring in an airplane flying over the ocean. There the
occupation of airspace by a plane and its passengers was equated with the jurisdictional requirement "on high seas." Through its somewhat strained analogy between
the occupation of airspace and the situation of longshoremen working upon a pier
the court in Marine Stevedoring reveals its apparent failure to overcome the "dock
as an extension of land" doctrine. See Note 7 supra.
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are "above" navigable waters could be held to have been sustained
"upon" such waters, thereby allowing coverage under the Long3
shoremen's Act.

4

As the court again addressed itself to situs, the validity of its conclusion that coverage under the Act was grounded upon employee
status was further weakened. Yet an added inconsistency in the court's
overall reasoning is also apparent. The proposition advanced that an
expansion of coverage under the Longshoremen's Act may be based
by implication upon the Extension of Admiralty Act necessarily requires adherence to the principle that a dock is an extension of land. 35
If a dock, the common situs of the injuries complained of in Marine
Stevedoring, can not be equated to land, then the Extension Act has
no application and the entire theory is superfluous. Assuming, then,
for the benefit of the relevancy of the second approach, that a dock
is an extension of land, the third theory to the effect that a pier is
equivalent to airspace above navigable waters cannot stand without
an appreciable distortion of reason and logic.
Thus the second and third "routes" taken by the court appear to
be mutually exclusive from the standpoint of consistency of application. Even if the alternatively dispositive nature3 6 of the theories
can be validly advanced, the total effect which remains to be examined
reveals the following improbabilities: (i) status is controlling, so all
longshoremen are brought within the coverage of the Act; (2) situs
is determinative where a dock is an extension of land; and (3) situs
is controlling where a dock is not an extension of land, i.e., it is airspace over navigable waters. These fundamental inconsistencies not
only reflect the frailties inherent in a "shotgun" approach where established precedent is sought to be overcome, but also seem to substantially weaken the result itself from the standpoint of a strict legal
37
analysis.
Because the Longshoremen's Act was designed "to assure to injured waterfront employees the simple, prompt, and certain proa898 F.2d at 9o8.

3The Extension of Admiralty Act relates to an expansion of jurisdiction to
occurrences on land. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
w398 F.2d at 9o8.
37These inconsistencies were also noted in the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge
Haynsworth, wherein it was suggested that the three theories must be read together "(s]ince the [status] theory would bring all longshoremen within the coverage of the Act, reference to the other theories suggests that coverage would
exist only if the circumstances satisfied all three of them." S98 F.2d at 913 (dissenting opinion).
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tection of workmen's compensation .... "38 the multitude of litigation concerning the situs principle and its nebulous boundaries suggest that this goal has not been achieved. 30 It was perhaps with an
apprehension of this ultimate failure that most interested parties
favored a status approach from the very beginning.4 0
Noting this common desire, the court suggested that it was "reasonable to infer" that the corresponding language of the Act represented an assent to the requested broader coverage, i.e., that the
status of the injured longshoremen was determinative. 41 Certainly it
is logical to assume that Congress would have attempted to satisfy the
desires of the very parties to be affected. Yet a closer look reveals
that prior to the proposal of the bill which became the current Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme Court in separate decisions42 had declared two congressional enactments extending state compensation
law to maritime workers unconstitutional as invalid attempts to
delegate federal power to states.43 Undoubtedly well aware of the unconstitutionality of its earlier efforts in this area, Congress, it seems
much more "reasonable to infer," would have wanted to avoid the
almost certain constitutional questions which would have arisen had
jurisdiction under the Act been grounded upon status, thus allowing
44
measurable federal infringement in matters of local concern.
However, if both the desires of the parties affected by the compensation statute and the remedial goals sought to be attained by its
passage are better satisfied by the ingrafting of the status theory, there
should be congressional action extending coverage under the Longshoremen's Act to include all longshoremen and harbor workers who
!Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 274 (1959) (dissenting
opinion) (emphasis added); see Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 254
(1942).
See Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
of 1927: Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 1553, 1569 (1966).
10398 F.2d at 9o3. At the time the proposed legislation which eventually became
the Longshoremen's Act was under consideration by Congress, representatives of
both the union and the shipping industry urged that status of employment be the
appropriate jurisdictional measure.
1598 F.2d at 903.
"Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 US. 149 (192o).
"3See GILMORE & BLACK 336-37 (1957); 3 LARSON § 89.21 (1968).
"The Supreme Court has noted that at the time the proposed act was being
considered, there was congressional doubt as to the constitutional power of Congress
to extend federal jurisdiction to injuries occurring on shore. Swanson v. Marra
Bros., 328 U.S. (1946).
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are injured while performing tasks incidental to their employment.4 5
Furthermore, the comprehensive nature of such coverage would be
sustainable from the standpoint of both legal 46 and practical4 7 considerations.
Ostensibly, the apparent effect of the decision in Marine Stevedoring, in fact, seems to afford the desired improvement in the situation of the injured longshoreman whose compensation remedy is uncertain. Acceptance of the status theory as being determinative would
remove the multitude of jurisdictional ambiguities ingrained in the
situs approach, 48 since injuries sustained by harbor workers in the
under the federal
scope of their employment would be compensable
49
act regardless of the locus of their occurrence.
Unfortunately, further examination of the alternative conclusions
reached by the court does not seem to allow the ameliorative result
See generally 3 LARSON §§ 91.71-.73 (1968) where, in a situation analogous to
the status theory type coverage proposed for the Longshoremen's Act, the author
suggests that all employees of interstate rail carriers be brought under a system
of work-related injury coverage so as to eliminate the problems of jurisdictional
litigation and uncertainty as exists under the Federal Employers Liability Act. As
an alternative proposal it is suggested that a federal workmen's compensation act
could be substituted for the FELA, and that the jurisdictional problems as have
arisen under the Longshoremen's Act could be avoided if federal coverage were
extended to all employees of interstate rail carriers. To leave these employees
totally within the various state acts (another possibility), the author notes, would
"produce some of the most complex tangles in all of compensation law." Id. at
§ 91.73. These same principles would also apply to an all-inclusive longshoremen's
act. See Gardner, Remedies for Personal Injuries to Seamen, Railroadmen, and
Longshoremen, 71 HARv. L. REv. 438 (1958); Comment, The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927: Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore
and the Longshoreman, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1553 (1966); Comment, Overlapping
Remedies for Injured Harborworkers:Interaction on the Waterfront, 67 YALE L.J.
1205 (1958).

"Any doubts as to the constitutionality of such comprehensive legislation would
today be erased by the application of the commerce clause. Johnson v. Traynor,
243 F. Supp. 184, 189 (D. Md. 1965); Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keefe, 22o F.
Supp. 881, 883 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965).
See also 3 LARSON § 91.71 (1968) where it is stated that the inclusive type coverage
would be constitutional in light of the commerce power.
l7There most certainly would be a desirable reduction in litigation owing to
the avoidance of the jurisdictional uncertainty inherent in the situs approach. Such
a reduction would mean a decrease in trial expenses and consequently lower insurance rates for employers. The savings could be applied not only to effect safer working conditions for longshoremen, but also to bolster the economic status of employer and employee alike.
r"The corresponding reduction of litigation would be desirable to all the
interested parties. See note 47 supra.
"Such inclusive coverage would apparently be constitutionally unobjectionable.
See note 46 supra.
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which an application of the status approach alone would provide. The
problematic boundary line between federal and state jurisdiction may
still persist in that it has been merely extended to the shoreward edge
of the pier. Also there may be no coverage under the Longshoremen's
Act if the dock itself is not located over navigable waters, or if a pierside injury is not occasioned by a ship or its instrumentalities. 50 Ultimately, the overall effect of Marine Stevedoring appears rather to
create further incongruity5l in the application of the Act itself as
well as to insure a continued hinderance to the prompt administration
of federal compensation to injured longshoremen.
These deficiencies stem from a judicial attempt to cure statutory
ills which are simply not amenable to comprehensive correction on an
ad hoc basis. The inherent incongruities of the Longshoremen's Act
have been recognized, but the curative process should be exercised
52
through legislative amendment, not by adjudication.
Considering the continued congressional inaction in this area,
the decision in Marine Stevedoring seems less impeachable. Avoiding
the temptation of treating the matter of dockside injuries to longshoremen in mere summary fashion owing to the strong line of precedent it faced, the court at least attempted a reasonable resolution of
"See note 29 supra.
"See 398 F.2d at 913 (dissenting opinion), wherein Chief Judge Haynsworth
delineates the "barrel of incongruities" created by the majority opinion.
"See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 286
(1952); Bue, In the Wake of Reed v. The S.S. Yaka, 18 HAmSTNGs L.J. 795, 807 (1967).
In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942) (concurring opinion), Mr.
Justice Frankfurter delineated the general nature of the problem:
Federal and state enactments have so accommodated themselves to the
complexity and confusion introduced by . . . [pre-Longshoremen's Act
Supreme Court rulings] that the resources of adjudication can no longer
bring relief from the difficulties which the judicial process itself brought
into being. Therefore, until Congress sees fit to attempt another comprehensive solution of the problem, this Court can do no more than bring
some order out of the remaining judicial chaos as marginal situations come
before us.
Id. at 259.
In his dissent in Marine Stevedoring, Chief Judge Haynsworth noted that
"Congress, if it wishes, may amend the [Longshoremen's Act] to extend its coverage
in a rational way to some point of reasonable certainty." 398 F.2d at 913 (dissenting
opinion). The inconsistencies of coverage between longshoremen on a vessel moored
upon navigable waters doing essentially the same type of work as others on an
adjacent pier are obviously undesirable, yet "any recourse is through legislative
action by way of amendment to the [Longshoremen's Act]." East v. Oosting, 245
F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D. Va. 1965).

